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It is now time for us to separate. Both you and I are
glad we are leaving. Your task was unpleasant and so
was mine. One thing I should point out. You should
not feel that we believed what you told us. Not one
word you uttered was true, but you delivered your in-
formation in such a way that we were in a position to
believe you. I want to thank you for this. 2
Secretary of State George Shultz wrote that the Treaty
Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles ("INF Treaty") "... has the most stringent and
comprehensive scheme of verification in the history of arms
control". 3 Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., speaking for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, referred to the intrusive on-site
inspection provisions of the Treaty as "unprecedented","1
while the Washington Post featured a column entitled, "Why
the INF Treaty Means the Nuclear Era Is Over". 3 With the
euphoria surrounding the treaty signing, it might appear the
United States and the Soviet Union had penned the ultimate
arms control measure, and any discussion of issues such as
verification would be moot. I suggest, however, that on-site
inspection can only represent an enhancement to verification,
one that is not inexpensive.
In considering the principles of verification, means
of confirming treaty compliance will be considered, as well
as possibilities other than on-site inspection. Questionable
1
2activities and noncompliance are mentioned for the first, but
certainly not the last, time. In the interest of brevity,
the history of verification and non-compliance--wlth and
without on-site inspect ion--is traced from post-World War I
to the present. That period provides two examples of on-site
verification: the Treat of Versailles and the Anglo-American
Naval Treaty. Germany ignored both and rearmed for the next
world war. The post-World War II era is viewed in terms of
three major agreements: SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty), ABM ( Ant iballist ic Missile Treaty), and SALT II; as
with the post-World War I period, noncompliance again is an
issue
.
In speaking of noncompliance, or deliberate cheating,
Soviet activity will be analyzed both through the eyes of
those who prepare annual reports to Congress on Soviet non-
compliance and those who toil to provide explanations for
Soviet misbehavior.
This paper is not concerned with the INF Treaty, al-
though this newest of arms agreements so grandly embraces the
principles of intrusive on-site inspection. Rather, the INF
Treaty's background, "ratification circus," and specific
provisions relative to intrusive inspection are presented. I
explain why on-site inspection, all the brouhaha (both East
and West) notwithstanding, is really no more than a comple-
ment to other forms of verification.
3The cost and complexity of implementing the on-site
provisions of the Treaty, and the opportunities these terms
offer for Soviet collateral intelligence collection by over-
burdening U.S. counterintelligence assets, serve to question
the popular political view of intrusive on-site inspection.
In my concluding remarks I recall the words of Admiral
John Godfrey, former Director of British Naval Intelligence,
from the discussion on post-World War I compliance to provide
guidance for us some sixty years later. First, a verifi-
cation pr imer
:
2.0 PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION
Whatever their form, agreements among nations always
stem from a belief by each party that it will benefit.
No altruism is involved. Thus all agreements, written
or understood, must be verified. No nation can afford
to trust another nation in matters affecting its fun-
damental security.'*
The word "verification", while very popular today, has
at least as many different definitions as discussants. I
define verification as the means by which one party to an
agreement determines whether or not the other party is
complying with its terms. 7 The "classical purposes" of
verification are often cited as detection and warning, with
the attendant features of deterring violations and
confidence-building (in the agreement)
.
B Some charge, how-
ever, that the mere mention of verification in discussing
arms control serves ". . .as a diversion, a roadblock en
route to a treaty. . ."--especially if doubts about
4ver if iability are raised. 19 Detection and warning are the
first purposes of verification to be considered.
2.1.1 Detection and Warning
If verification is to serve its classical purpose, it
must also be attended by traditional controversies, the most
notable being the issue of what exactly should properly be
detected. The possibilities range from violations of both
the letter and spirit of the agreement, to those that have
only military significance; and defining what should be
significant to the military always invites debate.
While it would seem best to perceive the earliest
possible warning of violations, the verification intelli-
gence process is usually over-burdened, and an excessive
number of false alarms will exact a very high political
price, along with loss of confidence in the total agreement.
Uncertainty also plays a very large role in the arms control
process. Figure 1, an arms control classic, illustrates how,
as the likelihood of detection decreases, the percentage of
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Figure 1. Ranges of monitoring and detection confidence.
Data from U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, The Salt II Treaty, Hearings , 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
July 16-19, 1979, or 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), p.
241; quoted in William F. Rowell, Arms Control Verification:
A Guide to Policy Issues for the 1980s (Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Ballinger, 1986), 17; and Michael Krepton, Arms Con-
trol: Verification and Compliance (New York: Foreign Policy
Association, 1984), 6.
It should be observed that the projection of risks and
benefits associated with noncompliance, and the estimation of
the likelihood of detection, both depend upon the analyst's
point of view.
2.1.2 Deterrence
The attitude persists that verification serves some-
what as a deterrence, although •*. . .deterrence depends upon
the Soviet perception of U.S. capabilities to detect and po-
litical will to respond to suspected Soviet violations. . . 10
However, judging from the rarely changing annual list of al-
leged Soviet violations, this view could easily be impeached.
2.2.3 Confidence Building
Milutin Civicin the Review of International Affairs
(founded by the Socialist Alliance of Working People of
Yugoslavia), wrote, ". . .adequate verification can also
become a factor in confidence building, an instrument in
expanding cooperation in disarmament. . . M11 Just as
6verification can build confidence, real or alleged violations
of an agreement can adversely affect the possibilities for
future treaties--even if the perceived activity has little
effect on national security. ia
2.2.1 The Verification Process
The verification process begins with the preparations
for arms control negotiation and continues for the life of
the agreement. There are four basic ways to verify a treaty:
(1) National technical means (NTM), such as satellite
surveillance, radar surveillance from locations outside
the borders of the countries monitored, radioactive air
sampling, teleseismic geophysical observations, and
communications intercepts; (2) cooperative means of
verification, such as the deliberate opening of certain
features of military systems to surveillance, specific
channeling of military products through agreed check-
points, and noninterference with the means of verifi-
cation; (3) on-site inspection; and (4) "soft" methods
of verification, such as using agents, interviewing
emigres, and analyzing information leaks. 13
Before INF, on-site inspection provisions generally were not
negotiable with the Soviet Union, and " . . .the limits of
NTM set the outer boundaries of potential arms control agree-
ments.!"* While on-site inspection might appear the most
error-free and thus uniquely desirable way to verify arms
control treaties, the right to inspection is valueless with-
out effective satellite surveillance, which identifies where
on-site inspections should best be directed. 1SS
Any discussion of verification must note that often the
most difficult arms control negotiations do not necessarily
involve the gentlemen from Moscow, but, rather, those in our
7own government bureaucracies
.
ie The process, however, is
said to build a broad consensus. 17" Aware of both diffi-
culties and bureaucracies, we inspect the role of Congress.
2.2.2 Congressional Approval
All arms control accords must be approved by the
Congress. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution requires
the advice and consent of the Senate by a two-thirds vote.
The 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act requires all agree-
ments that disarm or serve to reduce U.S. armed forces or
armaments to be handled either as treaties or by "further
affirmative legislation". SALT I was approved by a joint
resolution of Congress. Exactly how a proposed agreement is
to be processed is based upon informal agreement between the
executive branch and the Congress. 1<a
2.2.3 Monitoring
The distinction between monitoring and verification
should be clear. Monitoring is a technical activity con-
cerned with establishing (more or less] objective facts,
while verification is an interpretative activity. li Moni-
toring employs the constant technical assets of collecting,
analyzing and reporting. It is a continuing process, and is
not designed solely to detect violations. As noted, intel-
ligence systems are often taxed, and it is necessary to rank
significant targets for collection. 20
8The raw data is processed so analysts can effectively
use the information, while relying on a spectrum of sources,
and their knowledge of Soviet behavior patterns, for eval-
uation. Important as they are, the analysts must pass their
estimates to the policymakers for decision.
2.2.4 Questionable Activities: Policy Decisions and
Resolution
There are options available to the national leadership
concerning measures that may be taken against possible arms
control treaty violators: stop the offender and undo the
gains of his cheating; field a countervailing capability; or
find virtue in the new status quo. 21 Other possible reso-
lutions of the violation could include an acceptable expla-
nation of the activity, and agreement to: stop the activity;
prevent such activity in the future, and discuss the partic-
ular issue in continuing or future negotiations. 22 The last,
least desirable option for the chief executive would be to
abrogate the entire document—politically palatable only if
there was irrefutable evidence of a blatant breach.
Sanctions will take up little space here. While, in
theory, sanctions may range from public disclosure (however
ambiguous) to treaty abrogation, the United States has had
"no experience in levying sanctions (beyond public announce-
ment)"23 concerning Soviet violations. We recall from former
arms agreements that on-site inspections, violations, and the
deplorable lack of viable sanctions have gone hand-in-hand
before .
3.0 BACK TO THE FUTURE: ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, AND
NONCOMPLIANCE
Looking in the past to illuminate the present is hard and
risky. We can be more objective about the past and both
wonder and laugh over obvious stupidities and errors
—
especially if committed by strangers, long ago and far
away--but we cannot take our potential or imminent mis-
takes or foolishnesses lightly. 2 "*
Tracing our "great leap backward," we will begin with
the nonenforced provisions of the Treaty of Versailles,
including terms for on-site inspection. Next, we view the
nonenf orcement of the Anglo-American Naval Treaty. Moving to
the post-World War II era, ". . .the three agreements that
have played the most important regulatory function in the
Soviet-American strategic relationship. . ."'-= will be ex-
amined for verification processes and lack of compliance.
3.1 Post-World War I Disarmament Verification Efforts
Following World War I, the Allies established the
Inter-Allied Control Commission to supervise the disarmament
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Unfortunately, this
early exercise in on-site inspection was undermined both by
the failure of the Allies to maintain a common purpose and
the concerted efforts of the German government to secretly
rearm. It was not uncommon for inspectors to be physically
attacked, with visits discouraged by the hosts announcing
that they could not guarantee the safety of inspectors. In
1923 the Germans refused to provide liaison personnel for
10
French inspectors and inspections were hampered even more.
In 1926 the Inter-Allied Control Commission was replaced by a
conference of ambassadors, 265, with the Commission's final re-
port raising questions regarding Germany's good intentions:
Germany has never disarmed, has never had the intention
of disarming, and for seven years has done everything in
her power to deceive and "counter-control" the Commis-
sion appointed to control her disarmament .'*"*
The Allies regarded the report as an inconvenience, with the
document being largely suppressed. 20 Verification of an
agreement that followed the Treaty of Versailles fared no
better .
In Room 39: A Study in Naval Intel ligence , author
Donald McLachlan describes the Anglo-American Naval Treaty as
providing a case study of " . . .the distortion of intelli-
gence by politics . nv-"a As Adolph Hitler would not abide by
the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, the British
promptly wrote the Naval Treaty, for him also to ignore.
McLachlan observes, "Wishful thinking, that ever lurking
temptation for politicians dealing with military affairs--and
for serving officers involved in politics--is even more
conspicuous in this episode than that of the U-boat
sinkings."30 Admiral John Godfrey, Director of British Naval
Intelligence, noted the following caveats from the episode:
1. The unwillingness of authority to believe information
that has awkward political implications.
2. The tendency of naval officers, and others who have
taken part in negotiations, to become advocates of the
integrity of the persons with whom they secured agree-
ment, and to lose the skepticism which is part of vigil-
ance .
11
3. Our technicians may not be the best judges of enemy
intentions and achievement. They find it hard sometimes
to believe that what they cannot do or have not thought
of doing has been done by the other side. 31
3.2 Post-World War II Arms Control Measures
The Baruch Plan of 1946 was the first attempt to con-
trol nuclear arms, an effort by the United States which was
rejected by the Soviets; in 1954-1955, under the aegis of the
United Nations, disarmament measures were traded, but tense
relations between the two nations precluded agreements. 32
U.S. proposals for "open skies" (inspection by NTM, on-site
inspection, and exchanges of military information) in 1955
were rejected as only further attempts to spy on the Soviet
Union--and also because of both Soviet fondness for secrecy
and intentions to redress the existing military unbalance. 33
With the approach of parity, 3" several limited agreements
were reached over the next ten years: the Antarctica Treaty
(1959), Washington-Moscow Hot Line (1963), Outer Space Treaty
(1963), Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), Seabed Treaty (1972),
Accidental War Agreement (1971) and the Biological Warfare
Convention (1972). 3rs
It should be noted, however, that until Mikhail
Gorbachev took office, in all postwar negotiations the United
States called for intrusive inspections, while the Soviets





3.2.1 SALT I, ABM, and SALT II
In the late 1960s, U.S. officials In a series of public
statements suggested that the United States and the Soviet
Union begin talks regarding the control of strategic weapons;
however, the Soviet "liberation" of Czechoslovakia in 1968
delayed talks until 1969. 3-3r While there were many contro-
versies regarding the terms of the agreement (the numbers of
weapons were far from symmetrical, the defense responsibil-
ities of the countries differed, and each country had its
unique definition of "strategic"), President Nixon and
General Secretary Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the
Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms (SALT I) in
1972. Verification of the treaty was to be accomplished by
NTM, both sides agreeing not to interfere with the other's
verification efforts.
By treaty, the parties were prohibited from deploying
ABM systems, except at one site which would contain no more
than one hundred missiles. By interim agreement, the United
States and the Soviet Union were limited for five years to
the number of offensive strategic missiles under construc-
tion, or deployed, at the time the treaty was signed; each
country was free to substitute new weapons for old, and there
was no limit on long-range bombers. 3,a
Following the Interim Agreement of Strategic Offensive
Arms, signed in May 1972, the following November SALT II
negotiations began. Newly elected President Jimmy Carter
13
attempted to apply his "open diplomacy" and dramatically
change the levels previously agreed to at Vladivostok in
1974, but was rebuffed by the Soviets. Finally, under the
framework of the Vladivostok Accord, a settlement was reached
on SALT II and signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in
June 1979. 31» SALT II provided:
BY TREATY (which expired at the end of 1985):
The United States and Soviet Union are limited to an
aggregate of 2,400 strategic launch vehicles each
(ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) until the end of
1981. From then until the treaty expires, they are
limited to an aggregate of 2,250 each.
Until the treaty expires, the two superpowers are
limited by three sublimits within these overall
ceilings. They may not deploy more than 820 launchers
of MIRVed ICBMs; not more than 1,200 launchers of
MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs; and not more than 1,320
launchers of these MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers
equipped with long-range cruise missiles.
BY PROTOCOL (which expired at the end of 1981):
During the protocol period the superpowers are barred
from testing or deploying mobile ICBMs, and they are
barred from deploying cruise missiles with ranges
longer than 600 kilometers (about 325 miles)."*
In 1979, however, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the discovery of Cuban proxies fighting in Angola raised
questions regarding Soviet intentions. In 1980, President
Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration. Some
observers cited Soviet aggression in Afghanistan as the
reason,'* 1 while others said that the treaty was pulled back
even before the Soviet action, because of serious Senate
opposition to the agreement.**-2
14
3.2.2 Soviet Violations Under SALT I, ABM, and SALT II
A summary of the President's Reports to Congress on
Soviet noncompliance (see Table 1) lists one violation under
SALT I, one violation under ABM, and five alleged violations
under SALT II. Spread amongst the "violations'* we find
"probable violations," "almost certainly violations," "po-
tential violations," "probably has vlolateds," "may be pre-
paring," [to violate] and "ambiguous situations." While the
table summarizes reports only through March 1987, all that is
required to update it to December 1987 is to add an addi-
tional violation under ABM--the Soviets were charged with
deploying ABM radar components at Gomel.**3 The small changes
in the claimed violations from year to year could be the
result either of Soviet intransigence or lackluster imagi-
nation by administration analysts. The promised table:
TABLE 1
PRESIDENT'S REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE
ISSUES
1. Impeding Verification
by encryption of mis-
sile test telemetry
2. SS-25 as a violation




























3. Ban against SS-16 SALT II
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4. Strategic nuclear SALT II
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Source: Gary L. Guertner, "Three Images of Soviet
Science Quarterly 103 (Summer 1988): 329.
Arms Control Compliance," Political
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In ignoring the potential, probable, maybe, insuffi-
cient and ambiguous allegations, each of the listed charges
of Soviet noncompliance will be considered, beginning with
the "most blatant and serious,"'*'* the infamous Krasnoyarsk
radar
.
3.2.1.1 The Krasnoyarsk Radar
According to the U.S. Department of State, the large,
phased-array radar should be used only for space-tracking and
NTM verification, under the provisions of the ABM Treaty--not
for its identified purpose of ballistic missile detection.
It is claimed that the radar has not only the ability to de-
tect and track ballistic missiles, but also to contribute to
ABM battle management."*"
Even the strongest supporters of the Soviet compliance
record acknowledge, although grudgingly, that the radar under
construction violates the ABM Treaty: in a one-page article
in Arms Control Today discussing the radar, this acknowledge-
ment only comes in the second half of the story;"* fc while ad-
mitting concerns over construction of the radar, the Center
for Defense Information maintains that the only way really to
know if it serves an early warning function is to wait until
it is operating."* 7 One author describes the site as vio-
lating only the "intention" of the ABM Treaty."* 69 Of all the
yes-but or (perhaps) guilty with explanation accessions, Gary
Guertner's are perhaps the most thorough, and he will
represent the Red Team regarding the radar issue as well as
17
the five other alleged violations. First, here are the
basics, from Guertner
.
Soviet noncompliance can be measured by three compet-
ing images: the military significance of deliberate cheating,
Soviet bureaucratic culture, and conflicting interpretations
of treaty obligations. On the first score, it is claimed
that the radar is significant only in territorial defense,
and thus does not affect the strategic balance nor contribute
to a breakout fof the ABM Treaty] potential. Still, viewing
the radar issue from the military significance perspective,
it is agreed, however, that it might just undermine predic-
tability. Its obvious illegal positioning was dictated by
logistical and geographical problems of construction (the
Soviet bureaucratic culture in play), and regarding con-
flicting interpretations of the treaty obligations, the best
that can be suggested is that the Soviets are victims of im-
plied guilt."* 5* (One source does indicate that the Soviets
had tried earlier to erect two radars close to the northern
border, but gave up because of the construction difficulties
in permafrost condi t ions . =5°
It appeared, for a time, that the Krasnoyarsk radar
issue might be resolved in mid-1988, when the 20 July 1988
issue of Pravda stated that the Soviet Union would ". . .be
prepared to dismantle the equipment of the Krasnoyarsk radar
station in a manner that would lend itself to verification. .
. .
=1 In August it was announced by the White House that
18
President Reagan had "put off" a decision on whether the
radar represented a material breach of the treaty; 3* yet, in
October the President stated that the radar site was a "sig-
nificant violation" . Cf3 The Soviets continued their public
offers to resolve the matter, admitting in December 1988 that
Soviet scientists were competing with each other to find a
scientific use for the radar. 5"*
3.3.1.2 Use of Dismantled SS-7 Sites
In addressing the last charged violation under SALT I
and ABM--using remaining facilities at former SS-7 sites
—
apologists explain that the intent of the provisions was to
prevent the timely reactivation of old launch sites. The
Soviets assert that usage of the old SS-7 locations is per-
mitted because SALT I terms do not apply to mobile missiles,
and the facilities are not use to store, support or launch
ICBMs. To use the language of imagery, this controversy is
attributed to conflicting interpretations of terminology (the
definition of "facility") and treaty obligations and issues
(provision does not apply to mobile ICBMs). 5555 Gloria Duffy
reminds us that SS-7s were silo-launched, and the sites in
question would offer little to the mobile SS-25s--thls is a
matter of mere "technical concern"."6
3.3.1.3 Impeding Verification By Encryption
Article XV (3) of the SALT II Treaty prohibits "delib-




ambiguous terminology apparently drove the Soviets to over-
encrypt. It is argued that the Soviet Union has a tradition
of secrecy, that complex encryption is standard on all test
missiles, and, anyway, there are many other ways to gather
data.'38 One wag suggested that while the U.S. complained
about the encryption, it apparently was able to gain enough
information from the test telemetry to charge that the SS-25
was a second "new-type" ICBM. =S 'S Others aver that the Soviets
offered to modify their procedures in 1983 if the United
States would specify the types of telemetry information it
required to verify compliance
.
&° As perhaps anticipated by
the Soviet Union, the U.S. refused, stating that to accept
the Soviet offer would mean revealing its interception capa-
bilities." 1
3.2.1.4 SS-25 As A Second Type ICBM
SALT II allowed the United States and the Soviet Union
to develop and deploy one new type of ICBM. This missile was
defined as being different (greater than five per cent in-
crease or decrease) in any of one or more of (a) the number
of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-
weight, or the throw-weight of the missile, or, (b) the type
of propellant of any of its stages. The Treaty also called
for the parties not to test or deploy ICBMs with a single re-
entry vehicle (RV) with a weight of less than fifty per cent
of the throw-weight of the ICBM. &2 The U.S. alleged that the
SS-25 is a second new type of ICBM, in that the weight of the
20
RV is less than required, potential verification data on the
missile has been encrypted, the relationship between the
ss-25 and its launcher has been disguised, and former SS-7
sites now support the SS-25. s 3 This is all explained away by
apologists saying that such Soviet behavior is understand-
able, considering their ". . .loose constructionalist ap-
proach to complex treaty language," and suggesting that the
SS-25 does fall within SALT'S "compliant boundar ies"&*--ap-
parently here defined as those that apply to oneself.
Secretary of State George Shultz left the issue obscure when
he reportedly told a "This Week With David Brinkley" audience
in 1985 that, "There are questions about whether in a purely
technical sense, the SS-25 fits within the treaty language as
might be interpreted by a lawyer . " ess
3.2.1.5 Exceeding The Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
Limits
While the Reagan administration charged that the
Soviets had exceeded the cap of 2,504 total vehicles, a con-
troversy over the actual number arose, with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff listing 2,477 vehicles at the time. The United
States did not accept the argument that certain Soviet
bombers converted to tankers accounted for the difference,
saying that dismantlement procedures had not been estab-
lished. The U.S. refused to discuss such procedures in the
Standing Consultative Commission (SCO, the forum estab-
lished by SALT I to arbitrate such disputes. It was argued
21
that had the issue been discussed by the U.S., it would lend
legitimacy to a treaty the United States no longer considered
valid . s *i
Gary Guertner asserts that if the drafted bomber-to-
tanker conversion procedures had been signed, then the Soviet
levels would have dropped to fourteen below the permitted
limit. t47. He mentioned that the issue had no significant im-
pact on the strategic balance, did not undermine predictabil-
ity, and could be explained away by recalling that no final
agreement was reached on bomber-to-tanker conversions
.
SB
3.2.1.6 Launcher and ICBM Association
Article XV, First Common Understanding, of SALT II
calls for the Soviet Union and the United States not to im-
pede verification by disguising the association between
launchers and their ICBMs during testing. By making the as-
sociation, it is possible to establish whether a launcher
should be counted as a MIRVed (multiple independently tar-
getable reentry vehicle) or non-MIRVed launcher and whether
it falls within SALT II parameters
.
&a
While the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency likens this example of alleged Soviet deception
to the Potemkin village, 7" it is dismissed by others who note
that placing netting over the launchers was possibly the work
of overzealous Soviet bureaucrats using poor testing standard
operating procedures. 7" 1
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In reviewing the history of Soviet noncompliance, two
observations come to mind: first, NTM could use some help,
and second, while it appears that on-site inspection repre-
sents easy verification, the example of Germany disarming/
rearming illustrates that, regardless of provisions of the
treaty or agreement, and of the means of verification, if
both parties do not devoutly wish the pact to succeed, it
will surely fail.
4.0 THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY
They're just coming to snoop and then they're going to go
back home and bomb us. 72
In his last news conference, President Reagan once
again quoted his favorite Russian phrase: doveryal, no
proverya
i
--trust , but verify, referring to the extensive on-
site inspection verification procedures in the INF Treaty. 7'3
We shall examine the background of the treaty that showcases
the latest in on-site inspections, including what John Issacs
referred to as the "ratification circus." 7"* The specific
terms of the agreement will be reviewed, as well.
4.1 Background of the INF Treaty
The INF Treaty is explained by some as derived from two
concerns of western Europe: first, the deployment of Soviet
SS-20 mobile missiles, targeted on western Europe; and
second, the apparent preoccupation of the United States with
SALT II, which copes with the Issues of nuclear weapons aimed
at the U.S., not western Europe. After some discussion, in
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1979 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) decided to
modernize by deploying the Pershing II and GLCMs (ground
launched cruise missiles) as it simultaneously began talks to
reduce the SS-20 menace. The Soviet Union began an intense
worldwide public relations disinformation campaign (we cur-
rently see an intensified propaganda program, Gorbachev's
"new thinking" notwi thstanding) 7" 53 against the deployments,
arguing that parity existed in Europe--if French and British
nuclear assets and the forward-based aircraft of the United
States were included in the mix. While they called for a
freeze on INF deployments, the Soviets made no offer to
reduce their numerical advantage ."•'&
In 1983 the NATO missiles were deployed, and the Soviet
Union ended talks on the INF Treaty. In 1985, however, INF
negotiations were resumed, and over the next two years the
Soviets agreed on terms that did not include covering air-
craft, excluded French and British nuclear assets, banned INF
missiles in Asia, and required intrusive on-site inspec-
tions. 7' 7 The negotiations notwithstanding, at the time some
western defense experts asserted that the intermediate-range
Pershing lis in West Germany were important as a symbol of
the United State's commitment to defend western Europe. 7" 83
Reflecting both a growing Interest and increasing con-
cern regarding arms control, a 1987 report by the House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, entitled Intel-
ligence Support to Arms Control , listed verification as " . .
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.one of Its mo3t critical components." A summary of the
findings Included the following observations:
(1) The .. .SCC. . .has been under-utilized...
(2) There has been a lack of analysis on the military
significance of compliance behavior...
(3) Competitive interagency analysis within U.S. intel-
ligence on... Soviet arms control compliance has been
neglected . .
.
(13) The U.S. retains strong confidence in its ability to
monitor quantitative limits on Soviet strategic mis-
siles . . .
(14) There has been inconsistent application of moni-
toring judgments concerning U.S. proposals at the
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks on... mobile ICBMs,
ground-launched cruise missiles and non-deployed
missiles .
.
(15) The Challenger and Titan II disasters caused sched-
uling disruptions, but U.S. intelligence has been
able to maintain effective monitoring capabilities
for arms control
.
(16) The executive branch has failed over the years to
develop a comprehensive architecture for directing,
prioritizing and properly funding research and de-
velopment of new technologies for arms control mon-
itoring . . .
The Committee recommended that: executive branch use
the SCC more effectively, the JCS should assess the strategic
military significance of compliance issues, the lessons about
ambiguous treaty provisions be noted and future agreements be
more precisely written, and "On site-inspection regimes
should not be considered as substitutes in all cases for the
technological limits of national technical means." 690 On 8
December 1987 the treaty was signed by the leaders of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
The Christian Science Monitor suggests that the INF
Treaty reflects " . . .either extraordinary readiness to com-
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promise on the part of the Soviets or extraordinary skill and
tenacity on the part of American negotiators
.
nax Eight areas
of conflict between the two signatories are listed: the very
act of entering negotiations, INF linked to SDI (Strategic
Defense Initiative), equal warheads, British and French mis-
siles exempt, INF-range aircraft exempt, destruction of all
INF missiles, on-site inspection, and the 1972 West German
Pershing IA missiles exempt. The score, as kept be author
Elizabeth Pond, shows the Soviets conceding on all eight
points, and the United States giving in on four. 02 Soviet
Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze took exception
to claims that the Soviets had suffered at the bargaining
table, saying in Pravda , "Simple justice directs that they
admit concessions that they made in response."03
While not wholly accepting that the pact was signed in
the interests of world peace and international brotherhood,
it is noted that politicians Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbachev both needed the agreement: Reagan to preserve his
place in history and Gorbachev to keep his position in
Moscow. It has also been suggested that, with growing eco-
nomic problems In the Soviet Union, compounded by the cost of
cleaning up Chernobyl (eight to ten billion dollars), "* elim-
inating whole categories of weapons would represent a real
savings and help Gorbachev to at least provide a taste of
butter to his constituents. Whatever the actions of the two




4.2 The Ratification Circus
The INF Treaty was often described as having widespread
political support, 6" 15 ". . .headed for its required approval
by two-thirds of the Senate. ,Has At the time, a number of
factors were listed for these positive circumstances:
...strong approval by the American public, a broad, bi-
partisan sector of Congress and major U.S. allies;
energetic support by a hawkish president; and dramatic
breakthroughs In the details of the agreement, such as
elaborate provisions for U.S. officials to inspect Soviet
missile facilities. s^
This is not to say there was no debate; conservative
members of the Senate charged that the document was flawed in
both its implied assumption that the Soviet Union could be
trusted to comply with any agreement, as well as being de-
fective in specific provisions , mm Republican Senator Jessie
Helms led most of the assaults, alleging, among other things,
that while the Soviets might well be scrapping more missiles,
this supplied them with more warheads to put on new missiles
not covered by the pact. 031 Helms also charged that the
Soviets could substitute SS-25s for the banned SS-20s'BO and
that the Soviet Union was concealing between 165 and 300 of
the SS-20s. 31 Questions were also raised as to why pro-
visions for anywhere, anytime inspections were not in the
treaty as submitted, when some government officials had ear-
lier demanded the provisions.^*2
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Max M. Kapelman, chief negotiator for the United
States, responded to the issues raised by Helms and others by
stating that the explosive packet removed from the missiles
would not be a functioning warhead, since the reentry vehicle
would have been destroyed under the provisions of the
treaty.^3 In answering questions concerning the substitution
of SS-25s for SS-20s, INF negotiator Maynard Glitman ex-
plained that while the intercontinental SS-25s could threaten
both the United States and Europe, they did not present the
specific, perceived danger to the Europeans that the SS-20s
did. -3"* In discussing fears of a Soviet stockpile of hidden
SS-20s, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci asserted that
U.S. intelligence services had been uniform in their esti-
mates of the number of SS-20s, even though Helms had com-
plained that the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) had
estimated a higher number of the missiles than listed by the
Soviets. One possible explanation for Carlucci's apparent
unconcern was his feeling that even if there was a phantom
force of SS-20s, such a stockpile could not be tested without
detection, which would cause it to lose its military util-
ity.'"' The last of the complaints, concerning the anywhere,
anytime inspections, was answered by Glickman, who stated
that the administration, backed by the Pentagon, decided that
the price would be too high to allow Soviet inspectors to
visit the most sensitive facilities in the United States,
even though such trips would be reciprocal .'SCp It was later
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alleged by one source that strategic planners at the State
and Defense Departments had been too concerned with possible
benefits they might receive by visiting Soviet sites to
realize the severe impact such inspections would have on the
U.S. defense industry. Senior NSC [National Security
Council] officials were said to have been the first to
recognize the problem. *'*
As Senate testimony continued, Admiral Crowe was quoted
by the Committee on Foreign Relations as having said:
Suffice it to say, our discovery of cheating would run
counter to everything General Secretary Gorbachev is
trying to do in his public diplomacy, e.g., improve the
Soviet image; revitalize the Soviet economy in cooper-
ation with the West; and achieve more openness and candor
in Soviet society. In this broader political context,
cheating on the INF Treaty would be very risky business
and involve extremely high stakes.
"
s,ra
The report states that the Committee found Admiral
Crowe's arguments "very persuasive."33
Even as Pravda fretted that " . . .on the United State's
side of the ocean disarmament has many powerful opponents.
Their names and addresses are well known. . .", 100 on 27 May
1988 the Senate voted 93-5 to ratify the INF Treaty. In po-
litical terms, the agreement was described as offering some-
thing for everyone: it gave President Reagan a major arms
agreement for the history books, provided the Republicans an
election-year defense vote and allowed them to claim that
"peace through strength" really does work, and allowed
Democrats of the arms control persuasion an opportunity to
claim a victory against hardliner President Reagan. 101 And
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now for the arms control provisions that gave so much to so
many. . . .
4.3 INF Treaty Provisions
The INF Treaty requires the United States and the
Soviet Union to eliminate all ground-launched intermediate-
range missiles (IRMs, with a range of 1,000 to 5,500
kilometers), shorter-range missiles (SRMs, with a range of
500 to 1,100 kilometers), associated launchers, equipment,
support facilities, and worldwide operating bases. INF also
bans flight-testing and production, as well as launcher
production. 102 Table 2 lists the deployed missiles to be
destroyed under the INF Treaty:
TABLE 2
DEPLOYED MISSILES TO BE DESTROYED
(INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER -RANGE]
U.S. U.S.S.R.
TYPE NUMBER WARHEADS TYPE NUMBER WARHEADS
Pershing II 120 120 SS-20 405 1,215
GLCMs 309 309 SS-4 65 65
SS-12 220 220
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The Treaty is comprised of seventeen Articles, along
with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that details defi-
nitions, total numbers of missiles and launchers, missile
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deployment areas, missile operating bases and locations for
both deployed and nondeployed missiles. The Treaty is
supplemented by an inspection protocol and an elimination
protocol. 103 All facilities listed in the treaty, except for
missile production plants, are subject to some form of on-
site Inspection for thirteen years. The on-site inspections
are expected to fulfill five distinct functions, according to
Arms Control Today . 10 '*
The initial function (Article XI, paragraph 3] was to
establish a baseline inventory, by inspections at the opera-
ting bases and support facilities listed in the MOU, but not
including missile production sites. Elimination facilities
were also to be inspected to verify the number of units to be
destroyed. When this phase ended, a total of 146 inspections
had been made--115 visits to Soviet locations and 31 at sites
in the U.S.
A second purpose [Article XI, paragraphs 7 and 8] of
the intrusive inspections is to observe the actual destruc-
tion of the other party's equipment at the elimination cen-
ters, with destruction scheduled to take place over a three
year period.
After a support facility or missile operating base has
been eliminated, the agreement calls for a close-out inspec-
tion within sixty days to verify the removal and destruction




The fourth function [Article XI, paragraph 6 (a) or
(b)l of the on-site inspections is to monitor portals of
missile production facilities. Over the next thirteen years
the United States may place up to thirty resident inspectors,
twenty-four hours a day, around the perimeter of the Votkinsk
Machine Building Plant, where the SS-20 IRM and the non-
treaty SS-25 ICBM are assembled (along with usually nonlethal
Soviet washing machines). Because of the similarity of mis-
sile stages between the SS-20 and SS-25, U.S. inspectors are
confirming that SS-20 production has actually ceased. Soviet
inspectors are at the Hercules Plant at Magna, Utah, where
boosters for the Pershing were once made; boosters for both
the MX and Trident ICBMs are still in production at the
Hercules site.
The final function of on-site inspections under INF is
to conduct short-notice inspections, where the parties are
allowed up to twenty inspections per year in the first three
years of the treaty. 10=5 Figure 2 diagrams the "verification
of [the] INF deal"
.
5.0 ON-SITE INSPECTION: ONLY AN ENHANCEMENT?
President Reagan: We have listened to the wisdom in an
old Russian maxim. And I'm sure you're familiar with it,
Mr. General Secretary, though my pronunciation may give
you difficulty. The maxim is: doveryai, no proveryai --
trust, but verify.
General Secretary Gorbachev:_ You repeat that at every
meet ing
.
President Reagan: I like to. 10&
Even a casual review of the commentary generated by
Figure 2. Verification of the INF Deal. From Jerry Leggett
and Patricia Lewis, "Lifting The Lid On The Arms Treaty ,"
New Scientist
, 19 November 1987, 49.
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the INF Treaty reveals several recurrent themes that raise
questions about the widespread perception that on-site in-
tions represent some sort of panacea for arms control. The
cost and complexity of on-site inspections, the opportunities
for Soviet intelligence collection presented by intrusive on-
site inspection, and the revelation that verification is of-
ten in the eyes of its beholder, anyway, are concerns which
deserve discussion.
5.1 The Cost and Complexity Of On-Slte Inspection
It was estimated that it would cost between one hundred
and eighty and two hundred million dollars in 1988 alone to
pay for dismantling missiles and establishing monitoring
sites for the INF agreement. While lower expenditures are
expected later due to lower force levels, requirements now
demand ". . .substantial additions to the defense budget." 107.
In looking back once more, when the Great Powers agreed to
reduce the numbers of battleships and aircraft carriers in
1920, they simply spent the money improving and building more
cruisers, submarines, and other unrestricted weapons. 106*
It had been projected early that the On-Site Inspec-
tion Agency (OSIA) would employ some four hundred or more
persons to handle both U.S. and Soviet inspections, 10 "5' but
Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, director of OSIA, stated
that there were currently almost one hundred inspectors in
the Soviet Union, with approximately thirty at Votkinsk
alone. ll °
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The very mechanisms designed to build confidence In the
INF Treaty have been described as possibly causing problems
that in reality ". . .could create irritation and suspicion.
. . .
A11 because of their complexity. As an example, the
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers have been tasked with managing
the exchange of data bases, along with arranging the inspec-
tions. These new responsibilities are much more detailed and
complex than those in the Center's original mission. 112 The
very establishment of (yet) another agency, competing for
funds with existing bureaucracies, is expected to cause a
modicum of disruption, with even more interagency competition
and Congressional infighting anticipated. 113
5.2 Soviet Collateral Intelligence Collection
Probably the most sensationalized concern regarding the
on-site inspection provisions of the INF Treaty is (or was)
collateral intelligence gathering by the sanctioned Soviet
inspectors. Popular domestic newspapers and newsmagazines
outdid the tabloids with such articles as "Hunting For Hidden
Missiles," 11 -* "Getting Ready For Soviet Spies," 1185 "The
Glasnost Factor Is Spooking The Spooks," 11 *3, and "Soviets In
High-Tech Wonderland: More To See Than Rockets," 117" In "Eye-
ball To Eyeball," it is stated there are sixty-three defense
firms within a thirty-one mile radius of the inspected
Hercules facility in Utah, a plant that still makes the MX
missile, small ICBM, and Trident II, as well as developing
the Delta II and Titan IV rockets. 11B The same neighborhood
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includes the Redstone Arsenal, which is not only a missile
base but also home for a research and development center for
nuclear battlefield weapons, production and launch plants for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and
a facility for replicating and testing of classified non-U. S.
weapons . * 13
Senator Orrin Hatch, through his legislative assistant
Robert Lockwood, expressed concern that Soviet inspectors
could use inexpensive FM radios to obtain testing information
on systems not covered by the INF Treaty; it was also sug-
gested that Soviets could listen in on the cellular earphone
conversations of nearby defense engineers and executives. 120
With a bit less verve but no less concern, Aviation Week &
S pace Technology expressed the trepidations of the soon-to-be
inspected U.S. defense contractors in late 1987
.
ia * • t- 1*- :*
Responding to NSC observations regarding "profound im-
plications" for both the industry and government from on-site
inspections, contractors stated that they would have to shut
down production lines when inspected; there was concern that
the Soviet visitors could identify workers at specific (non-
INF related) work stations and target them for later contact
by espionage assets. It was also noted that contractors
sometimes mix production lines of both military and commer-
cial contracts at the same location, and it feared that dis-
ruptions from the inspections could affect deliveries of non-
INF materials. 1 *3
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While theses concerns were being raised, questions were
also asked about the abilities of U.S. counter-intelligence
(CI) agencies to deter Soviets who " . . .will be expertly
trained to look at what they're not supposed to see." 12'*
The FBI reportedly is reluctant to reassign agents due to its
own funding and manpower problems, but the U.S. Army's Offen-
sive Counter-intelligence Operations Program is expected to
assist the OSIA; even so, the Army unit's Technical Surveil-
lance Counter-Measures Program (TSCM) has been consistently
cut back over the years, with personnel reduced from one
hundred and sixty to just thirty-two in the past six years.
When the INF Treaty was signed there were a total of ten
agents in the United States. xza
In describing U.S. CI units as undermanned and beset by
many problems, it was reported that there are approximately
one hundred CI officers now in the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). In the 1970s director William Colby decentral-
ized CI operations, literally spreading the people and files
throughout the agency. With no separate career path, CI spe-
cialists must change positions to advance within the CIA,
causing a former agent to say, "If you want substantive know-
ledge, you kill it stone dead by making people move
around. " 1=:s
The subject of collateral intelligence gathering has
had little public attention since mid-1988. It is as if the
politicians who commanded the headlines earlier have ful-
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filled their duties to their constituents anent Soviet spies
and, after the Senate ratified the largely popular INF
Treaty, feel it in their interest to move on to other news-
worthy issues.
One news story, however, justified all the published
concerns of Senator Hatch and his analyst. The story, in the
22 July 1988 Los Angeles Times , told how eight Soviet missile
inspectors had been rejected by the United States because




As with most incidents casting adverse light on the INF
Treaty, this issue evaporated in a day or so, with no later
articles or discussion in the media. However significant it
is that the story was shortlived in the United States, it is
notable there was no mention of the event in the Soviet
press— none. There was, however, a reaction by the Soviets.
Some three and one-half weeks after the Times article,
in the article "Illegal Souvenirs," Izvestia tells of three
U.S. experts ordered to leave the Soviet Union after rock
samples and tools from a Soviet atomic test site were found
in crates being shipped to the United States. A White House
spokesman stated, "We don't believe it was intelligence ac-
tivity of any kind. . ." ia: <ia while it appears there was not
much intelligent activity taking place, the clumsy attempt
by the rock collectors might have been sanctioned by their
country of origin.
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5.3 Verification Is Often In The Eye Of Its Beholder(s)
An agreement will succeed only if the parties to that
agreement want it to succeed. To list al the recycled "new"
verification features of the INF and somehow infer that these
will assure compliance and, thus, peace in our time, is as
illogical as it is dishonest.
The on-site occupation by the Allies of post-World War
I Germany--the ultimate in intrusive on-site inspection—did
not guarantee either compliance or peace.
6.0 Concluding Remarks
What history teaches us is that men never learned
anything from it.* 2 '9
Although the Treaty Between the United States and the
Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles only affect about five per cent of
all nuclear weapons, much of the euphoria that followed the
signing and ratification of the Treaty could be attributed to
the "historic" verification provisions calling for intrusive
on-site inspections. A review of past on-site agreements,
such as the Treaty of Versailles and the Anglo-American Naval
Treaty, however, might have caused backers of INF to choose
another adjective to describe the pact. Unfortunately, the
compliance records generated by ABM, SALT I, and SALT II are
not free of blemishes, a result more of imprecise, poorly
written agreements and a lack of effective sanctions than the
total reliance on existing NTM.
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Suggested reasons for embracing the INF Treaty, besides
the often quoted western European fear of the Soviet SS-20s,
include the political need for an agreement, the savings in
wiping out entire categories of weapons, and the ever-popular
"peace in our time." Despite apparent monetary savings, the
costs and complexities involved in implementing the on-site
inspection provisions have raised concerns, as have the bur-
dens placed on deteriorating U.S. CI assets assigned to guard
against Soviet collateral Intelligence gathering. (While
U.S. intelligence agencies relish opportunities for our col-
lateral intelligence gathering, the episode of the Rock
Collectors at Semipalat insk might well temper their antici-
pation. )
While it may be worthwhile to express concerns, raise
old arguments, and generally disparage the world's newest
arms control measure, the INF Treaty has been signed and rat-
ified, a fait accompl
i
What of the future?
The first order of business must be to rebuild U.S. CI
capabilities, to assure that there are at least more than the
ten TSCM agents mentioned in the U.S. News & World Report ar-
ticle cited earlier. We hope that the CIA will find ways to
enhance its CI career path. While a critical issue, it will
be very difficult to monitor through open sources.
My next suggestion is that rhetoric be replaced by con-
structive action by the current administration, and, while
this calls for a dramatic break with the past, it is long
40
overdue in arms control. Formerly, more energy has been
spent In publicly charging violations than was expended In
developing verification capabilities and technologies, trying
to work out issues in the SCC, or forming policy calling for
arms control in the context of a comprehensive security
policy. 130 It is one thing to persist adamantly in on-site
verification (knowing the other side will never agree), and
yet another to be unprepared when agreement is finally
reached
.
In a last reference to history, the concerns of Admiral
John Godfrey of ". . .losing the skepticism which is part of
vigilance. . .»* :31 should be recalled when it is argued that
concessions to arms control provisions should be made in the
interests of opening a dialogue with the Soviet Union, and in
the name of detente. Past efforts have gone nowhere, and
there appears to be few Instances where the Soviet Union has
sacrificed its perceived national security in the interests
of a peace initiative, a treaty, or detente.
Keeping Admiral Godfrey's words in mind, while re-
sponding to suggestions that arms control between the United
States and the Soviet Union might be enhanced by helping
General Secretary Gorbachev in his efforts at glasnost and
perestrolka , it should be clear that it Gorbachev succeeds,
he might well be able to afford both guns and butter. His
international duty will once again take priority. Should
Gorbachev fail, it is assumed that he would be replaced by "a
41
man of the old Russia". 132
My introduction began with an Allied on-site inspector
bidding goodby to his counterpart in post-World War I
Germany, acknowledging the failure of the verification ef-
forts. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were prob-
ably touted as highly as those for the INF Treaty, and while
most are convinced that man is ever so much wiser some eighty
years later, only time will measure the success of the
Treaty. While on-site inspection Is an enhancement, it must
be part of a well developed national security policy, one
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